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INTRODUCTION 
As this symposium commences, originalism is a hot topic to discuss and a 
cool position to advocate.  Either portion of that statement would have been 
nearly inconceivable two decades ago when I started in academia.  Originalism 
at that time was something of an intellectual backwater, with a very limited set 
of adherents and an even more limited set of critics who were willing to take 
originalist ideas seriously.1 
Today, as Boston University School of Law welcomes Jack Balkin and 
David Strauss, two of the leading lights in modern constitutional theory, to a 
conference dedicated to their recent books on constitutionalism,2 originalism 
has gained a whole new set of sophisticated defenders3 and critics.4  Professor 
Balkin is particularly prominent among those new defenders, having emerged 
as arguably the foremost representative of what is sometimes called the “New 
Originalism” (or occasionally even the “New New Originalism”5).  Professor 
 
∗ Professor of Law and Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  I am grateful to Jack Balkin and David Strauss for inspiring and improving this 
Comment. 
1 For nearly identical thoughts from another quarter on the increasing prominence of 
originalism, which I came across after I had written this paragraph, see Jack N. Rakove, Joe 
the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 575-76 (2011). 
2 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM]; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).  In Professor Balkin’s 
case, one should properly say one of his recent books on constitutionalism.  See JACK M. 
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
3 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
4 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011). 
5 Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS 
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Balkin’s Living Originalism is certain to become the canonical expression of 
an important variant of originalist theory.  Professor Strauss, for his part, has 
long been one of the most prominent of originalism’s “Old Critics,” and The 
Living Constitution is the most artful and legally grounded affirmative 
statement that I have read of the “common law constitutionalist” approach.  It 
is a pleasure to be able to comment on these remarkable works by these 
remarkable scholars. 
My comments here will focus on two observations that must (for reasons 
that will become evident quite shortly) stand more as clarification than as 
critique.  First, I think it is a mistake to analyze the work of either Professor 
Balkin or Professor Strauss from the standpoint of legal interpretative theory, 
because neither of them is really setting forth a theory of legal interpretation – 
either an originalist theory or an alternative to originalist theory.  Rather, 
Professors Balkin and Strauss are both engaged in projects that are most 
appropriately understood and examined by reference to disciplines other than 
(or at the very least in addition to) legal interpretation, such as political theory, 
moral theory, or sociology.  This is most clear with respect to Professor 
Strauss, who is openly setting forth a theory of adjudication and governance 
rather than a theory of legal interpretation.  Professor Balkin is harder to pin 
down because his project is simultaneously pursuing a rather large number of 
ends, of which legal interpretation is plainly one.  But legal interpretation is a 
small part of Professor Balkin’s overall project, and so the project is probably 
predestined to be relatively unsuccessful as legal interpretation (though it may 
prove to be extremely successful at other tasks).  In Part I of this Comment, I 
describe the potential problems with asking too much of interpretative theory, 
as I think Professor Balkin does.  Interpretative theory should focus on 
interpretation, not on other activities, however useful those other activities 
might be.  
Second, as do many of the so-called “New (or New New) Originalists,” 
Professor Balkin draws heavily on a distinction between the ascertainment of a 
text’s objectively-discoverable meaning and the construction of a text’s 
meaning when ascertainment of meaning is impossible (or otherwise 
undesirable).6  Using Professor Balkin as an exemplar for the larger 
“construction project” that now dominates much of the originalist literature, I 
suggest that the move from ascertainment to construction is premature, or at 
least inadequately defended.  Construction is an adjudicative response to 
interpretative indeterminacy, but it is not the only possible response.  In Part II, 
I argue that, at least in the context of the federal Constitution, there is an 
interpretative response to interpretative indeterminacy that (largely) obviates 
any need for construction, because the response itself is not interpretatively 
indeterminate in any relevant sense.  As the old story goes, it’s interpretation 
all the way down. 
 
L.J. 707, 709 (2011). 
6 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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Given the constraints of time and space, I am largely passing over the many 
important points on which Professor Balkin and I agree.7  Those points of 
agreement could easily consume an entire article.  We agree that, inter alia, (1) 
it is a conceptual mistake to confuse questions of interpretation with questions 
of institutional role,8 (2) there is a crucial distinction between interpreting the 
Constitution and giving normative weight to those interpretative conclusions,9 
(3) original expectations do not determine original meaning,10 and (4) one 
should not pre-judge how rule-like (or un-rule-like) any particular 
constitutional provision must be.11  That is much upon which to agree. 
But it is generally more productive, or at least more fun, to discuss matters 
on which people disagree, and so that is where I will direct my energy. 
I. CITY SLICKERS III: THE LEGEND OF CURLY’S INTERPRETATIVE THEORY 
In formulating a theory of interpretation of the federal Constitution, what 
functions does one want that theory of interpretation to perform? 
In Jack Balkin’s case, the list is quite long.  Professor Balkin has very grand 
ambitions for interpretative theory.  According to Living Originalism, 
 
7 Professor Strauss and I agree on much less, but that is not particularly surprising.  One 
very important point on which we do agree concerns the Constitution’s potential role as a 
locus of “common ground,” STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 101-02, or as economists might call 
it, as a Schelling point.  But while Professor Strauss would essentially limit that “common 
ground” function to matters that need to be settled rather than settled correctly, see id. at 
104, I would consider using the coordination function of the Constitution as part of a 
broader account of the normative reasons why one might choose to be a “deadhead” and 
follow a document written and ratified more than two centuries ago, see Gary Lawson, On 
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1832-33 (1997).  But since I do 
not have a normative theory of constitutionalism that I am prepared to describe in a 
scholarly work, I will content myself for now with just considering it. 
 With respect to what the world might look like if originalism as an interpretative theory 
was faithfully followed as an adjudicative theory, see STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 12-16, 
Professor Strauss is partly right and partly wrong, at least from the standpoint of the 
(correct) originalist approach that I would advocate, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006) (setting forth a theory 
of “reasonable observer originalism”).  However, to sort out from among Professor Strauss’s 
conclusions the clearly correct (“[s]tates could freely violate the principle of ‘one person, 
one vote’ in designing their legislatures”) from the mostly correct (“[m]any federal labor, 
environmental, and consumer protection laws would be unconstitutional”) from the 
probably correct (“[t]he Bill of Rights would not apply to the states”) from the mostly wrong 
(“[t]he government would be free to discriminate against women”) from the clearly wrong 
(“[r]acial segregation of public schools would be constitutional” and “[t]he federal 
government could discriminate against racial minorities  (or anyone else) pretty much any 
time it wanted to”) would take a separate article.  STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 12-16. 
8 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
9 See id. at 38. 
10 See id. at 6-10. 
11 See id. at 6-7, 14, 23-24, 45. 
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interpretative theory at a minimum needs to (1) ascertain the semantic meaning 
of constitutional language,12 (2) construct meaning when the ascertainment of 
semantic meaning is not possible,13 (3) be “adequate to our history as a 
people”14 by explaining and accounting for constitutional developments widely 
regarded as good, (4) explain the process of constitutional change by (among 
other things) “account[ing] for how political and social movements and post-
enactment history shape our constitutional traditions,”15 (5) allow for “viable 
critiques of existing practices in the name of a deeper constitutional fidelity,”16 
(6) provide a vehicle for popular discourse about political and social change,17 
(7) connect the present and past in a fashion that promotes “identification 
between ourselves, those who lived in the past, and those who will live in the 
future,”18 and (8) “promote the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional and 
legal system that is based on the idea of popular sovereignty,”19 which requires 
attention to sociological, procedural, and moral aspects of legitimacy.20  An 
interpretative theory that can ascertain meaning, construct meaning, explain 
history and change, facilitate critique and discourse, and legitimate a political 
order along at least four dimensions of legitimacy is quite an amazing 
phenomenon.  But is it the best interpretative theory? 
Probably not, if – and this is a very large if – one judges an interpretative 
theory by how well it interprets.  Asking an interpretative theory to perform all 
of the tasks asked of it by Professor Balkin is like asking schools to teach 
reading, writing, arithmetic and social skills and self-awareness and 
comparative cultures and the facts of life and a dozen other topics that have 
not been part of formal education until recent decades.  The notion that one can 
do all of those things and still teach reading, writing, and arithmetic at the 
same levels as before is highly problematic (as anyone who has tried to take 
eighth-grade reading, writing, or arithmetic tests from a century ago can 
attest).21  Just like smartphones that surf the net, keep appointment calendars, 
 
12 Id. at 4. 
13 See id. at 5. 
14 Id. at 10; see also id. at 90 (“A theory of constitutional interpretation should be able to 
explain why . . . changes [that demonstrate the best features of the American constitutional 
tradition] are faithful to the Constitution rather than being mistakes or deviations from 
constitutional fidelity . . . .”). 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id. at 94. 
17 See id. at 71-72, 93-94. 
18 Id. at 63. 
19 Id. at 64. 
20 See id. at 64-65. 
21 See Are the People of the World Being Dumbed Down?, THE CROWHOUSE,   
http://www.thecrowhouse.com/8th_test.html (last visited May 28, 2012) (providing what 
purports to be a middle-school exam from 1895).  There are some questions about whether 
the exam was really aimed at students rather than teachers, but even if it was aimed at 
teachers, it says something about what was expected to be taught. 
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and function as mobile gaming stations, but fail dismally as telephones because 
they drop calls whenever your hair brushes against the screen, an interpretative 
theory that multitasks may gain its breadth and power only by losing a big 
chunk of its ability to interpret. 
In City Slickers, Curly Washburn (played by an Academy-Award-winning 
Jack Palance) had the following memorable exchange with Billy Crystal’s lead 
character, Mitch Robbins: 
Curly: Do you know what the secret of life is? 
Mitch: No, what? 
Curly: [holds up one finger] This. 
Mitch: Your finger? 
Curly: One thing.  Just one thing.  You stick to that and everything else 
don’t mean sh*t. 
Mitch: That’s great, but what’s the ‘one thing’? 
Curly: [smiles] That’s what you’ve got to figure out.22 
Curly was a smart man – or at least a smart interpretative theorist.  There are a 
great many circumstances – as anyone familiar with David Ricardo can verify 
– in which it makes sense to focus on one task rather than to split attention, 
energy, and resources among multiple tasks.  Of course, that is not universally 
the case; sometimes pursuing multiple ends is independently desirable even if 
it is, by some measure, inefficient.23  But the cost – the opportunity cost, if one 
will – is likely to be some loss, perhaps a very significant loss, in the 
achievement of the original, principal task.24 
So what is Curly’s “one thing” for interpretative theory?  Without waxing 
too Aristotelian, I will venture to say that the distinctive excellence of 
interpretative theory is to interpret – that is, to ascertain meaning.  It is quite 
possible to charge interpretative theory with many additional tasks.  Indeed, I 
have just read a multi-hundred-page book that graphically demonstrates that it 
is possible to give it such a charge with flair, eloquence, and great 
sophistication.  But to the extent that interpretative theory is asked to perform 
tasks beyond the ascertainment of meaning, there is the danger that it will do a 
poorer job of ascertaining meaning than if it was given only that single task.  
 
22 CITY SLICKERS (Castle Rock Entertainment 1991). 
23 See, e.g., ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE: THE LIVES OF LAZARUS LONG 
248 (1973) (“A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a 
hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a 
bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, 
analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight 
efficiently, die gallantly.  Specialization is for insects.”). 
24 To use Heinlein’s example: time that I spend learning to butcher hogs is time that I do 
not spend raising my kids or learning how to teach Evidence.  And the chances of my ever 
achieving proficiency at hog-butchering, given that I have motor-planning problems, are 
fairly low. 
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There is also the danger that it will do a poorer job of accomplishing the 
additional tasks with which it is charged than would some other enterprises or 
disciplines that are more tailored to those tasks.  For example, perhaps moral 
theory or political theory might be a better tool for pursuing democratic or 
moral legitimacy than is interpretative theory, and perhaps sociology might do 
a better job of explaining and accounting for social change and addressing 
issues of sociological legitimacy. 
There is nothing logically necessary about any of these speculations.  It is 
surely theoretically possible for an interpretative theory to turn out to be the 
ultimate, optimal tool for ascertaining meaning, explaining change, providing 
legitimacy, and doing any number of other tasks that seem better suited to 
pursuit by other methods or disciplines.  It just seems darned unlikely. 
To demonstrate conclusively that any particular interpretative theory with 
divided attention will do a poorer job of ascertaining meaning than will a 
different interpretative theory with a one-track mind, one would have to lay out 
the correct approach to ascertaining meaning and then show how some specific 
dedicated interpretative theory better discovers that meaning than does the 
multitasking theory at hand.  That is obviously an ambition well beyond this 
modest Comment.  My narrow point here – which I style as a clarification 
rather than as a critique of Professor Balkin’s work – is simply to raise the 
issue. 
Yet it is an important issue to raise.  Just suppose, hypothetically, that some 
version of what Professor Balkin calls “skyscraper originalism”25 – say, a 
theory that locates the meaning of the Constitution in the understandings that 
would have been held at the Constitution’s origin by a reasonable observer in 
possession of all relevant information – turns out to be the best theory for 
ascertaining objectively-discoverable constitutional meaning but does a very 
poor job of legitimating the constitutional order, accommodating social 
movements, explaining historical developments, or inspiring the populace.  
And suppose that one can get more legitimation, accommodation, explanation, 
and inspiration by tweaking the interpretative theory in a fashion that reduces 
its ability to ascertain meaning.  Is it a better interpretative theory for the 
tweaking? 
It may very well be a better theory across a range of metrics, but it is not 
clear that it is a better interpretative theory for the change.  A hammer might 
well be improved, as measured by some considerable number of metrics, by 
being whittled down to a very thin stick of wood – if, for example, one really 
wants something that will stir coffee or pick food out of teeth rather than 
something that will pound nails.  But it will not be a better hammer, even if it 
will be a better implement.  Similarly, a multitasking interpretative theory 
could well be considered, on balance, a better theory than a focused 
interpretative theory, depending upon what goals one is trying to accomplish.  
It just will not be a better interpretative theory qua interpretative theory. 
 
25 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 21. 
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Professor Balkin need not be deeply threatened by any of this, because 
interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning is only a subsidiary goal of his 
theory.  In this he is not alone.  When Professor Balkin says that “[c]oncerns 
about legitimacy underwrite theories of constitutional interpretation . . . [and] 
we argue for or against different theories of constitutional interpretation in 
terms of their effects on legitimacy,”26 he is not simply describing his own 
project but is also describing the vast majority of what the legal culture regards 
as constitutional scholarship and argument.  He is certainly describing 
Professor Strauss, who takes legitimation and explanation as touchstones of 
constitutional theory because he is really setting forth a theory of adjudication 
(governance) rather than a pure theory of interpretation.  Professor Balkin is 
also describing most self-proclaimed originalists, especially “Old Originalists,” 
for whom interpretation is generally an instrumental goal in ultimate pursuit of 
some version of legitimacy (meaning that they, too, are generally more 
interested in theories of adjudication and governance than in theories of 
interpretation simpliciter).27  In fact, Professor Balkin may be describing pretty 
much everybody in the American legal culture except me and Mike Paulsen.28 
Accordingly, it would be somewhat sideways for me to argue that Professor 
Balkin’s approach does not ascertain constitutional meaning as accurately as 
would some other approach.  I am not at all sure that Professor Balkin would 
even contest the point.  Accordingly, I will leave him (and to a lesser extent 
Professor Strauss) with the following thought: If one has objects other than the 
ascertainment of meaning in mind for interpretative theory, perhaps one should 
pursue those objects with methods and disciplines uniquely suited to pursuing 
them.  Interpretative theory can always share the load with political theory, 
moral theory, history, sociology, political science, anthropology, psychology, 
and a host of other disciplines that are ready and eager to explain, account for, 
and legitimate all manner of social practices.  I fear that by loading all of the 
weight upon interpretative theory, Professor Balkin has sacrificed a perhaps 
considerable degree of ascertainment29 in order to achieve goals that could 
better be achieved by other, non-interpretative means.  As Mr. Scott once said, 
“The right tool for the right job.”30 
II. THE NO-CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Why interpret the Constitution?  Why bother ascertaining its meaning?  One 
possible reason, of course, is to follow the Constitution as a plan for 
 
26 Id. at 64. 
27 See Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 
(2002). 
28 See, e.g., Larry Yackle, In Medias Res, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1259 (2012). 
29 In particular, his understanding of the scope of federal regulatory power, see BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 138-82, is much easier to defend as legitimation than 
as ascertainment, though that is a topic for a separate article. 
30 STAR TREK V: THE FINAL FRONTIER (Paramount Pictures 1989). 
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governance.  If, for example, one has sworn an oath (as a judge or other public 
official) to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, and if one takes 
oaths seriously as moral obligations (perhaps defeasible obligations if 
following them leads to extremely vile consequences), one might think it 
important to know precisely what one has sworn to preserve, protect, and 
defend.  Indeed, one might even want to know that information before deciding 
whether to take the oath. 
As Professor Balkin points out, that is hardly the only reason one might 
want to ascertain constitutional meaning.  One might interpret the Constitution, 
for example, “to understand its historical or sociological importance or to 
compare it with other constitutions.”31  But assume for the moment that one 
has decided, however contingently, to accept the Constitution as a plan for 
governance (perhaps because doing so will push the world marginally closer to 
a normative ideal, at a lower cost, than other readily-available strategies).  How 
much guidance does the Constitution actually provide?  Does the Constitution 
provide direct answers to most or all of the concrete questions that arise in 
governance, or does it provide only a skeletal outline of the rough shape of 
those answers?  Is the Constitution a largely completed (and therefore mostly 
dead) skyscraper or a largely unfinished (and therefore mostly living) 
framework? 
That is one of the most fundamental questions posed by Professor Balkin, 
and he spends much of his book defending and articulating the latter position.  
The mechanism for filling out the supposedly skeletal constitutional 
framework is constitutional construction, which involves “implementing and 
applying the Constitution using all of the various modalities of 
interpretation”32  It is (to borrow a phrase) common ground among many, and 
perhaps even most, modern originalists that construction begins where 
interpretation-as-ascertainment leaves off.33  According to these thinkers, 
construction is the inevitable and unavoidable response to interpretative 
indeterminacy.  If the constitutional text answered all possible questions, there 
would be no need for construction.  But given any degree of indeterminacy, 
something must fill the gap.  Thus, so the argument goes, all plausible 
 
31 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 38. 
32 Id. at 4.  The terminological distinction between interpretation and construction is 
often traced to KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-2 (1999), though the substantive distinction between 
discovering and applying norms is ancient.  For a remarkably thorough but compact 
introduction to the interpretation/construction distinction, see Randy E. Barnett, 
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011). 
33 See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 22 (observing that 
originalism-as-ascertainment “will not be sufficient to decide a wide range of 
controversies”); Barnett, supra note 31, at 70 (“Unless there is something in the text that 
favors one construction over the other, it is not originalism that is doing the work when one 
selects a theory of construction to employ when original meaning runs out, but one’s 
underlying normative commitments.”). 
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originalist theories need (and employ) construction, and so all plausible 
originalist theories are “framework” rather than “skyscraper” theories.  At that 
point, the only remaining questions are (1) how much indeterminacy actually 
exists (i.e., how many floors of the skyscraper remain to be built) and (2) 
which tools for construction will one employ.  Since the latter question is 
seemingly normative rather than interpretative,34 originalism-as-ascertainment 
cannot choose from among the plausible methods of construction.  
Accordingly, the only relevant metrics for choosing among interpretative 
theories – treating construction as an aspect of interpretation – involve 
precisely the multifaceted considerations that drive Professor Balkin’s analysis. 
I want to dissent from the originalist construction project and declare the 
Constitution a “no-construction zone.”  In adjudicative theory, one does not 
need construction to deal with interpretative uncertainty because there is an 
interpretative answer to interpretative uncertainty in adjudication.35  I have set 
forth that answer elsewhere36 and will only briefly reiterate it here. 
In a normal trial within the American legal system, there can be 
considerable uncertainty about the facts.  The trier of fact may be genuinely 
uncertain about what really happened.  The solution to this uncertainty is not to 
come up with some extra-evidentiary mechanism for constructing facts but to 
allocate the burden of uncertainty to one party or the other.37  In a criminal 
case, if the government cannot establish its version of the facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the government loses.  If a civil plaintiff cannot convince the 
fact-finder that its version of events is more likely than not the true account, 
that party loses.  It loses not because the fact-finder necessarily constructs 
some alternative account of the facts, decides that the alternative account is 
correct, and then enters a verdict.  It loses because of the resulting uncertainty, 
not because the resulting uncertainty is somehow resolved.  In adjudication, 
one does not need epistemological certainty in order to achieve adjudicative 
determinacy.38  One only needs the appropriate standards of proof and burdens 
of proof that, together, determine who wins and loses when the epistemological 
answer is “beats me.”39 
 
34 See Barnett, supra note 32, at 70-72. 
35 As a matter of pure interpretative theory, apart from the demands of adjudication, the 
problem of construction can never arise, because “I don’t know” is always available as an 
interpretative answer.  In adjudication, however, “if you choose not to decide, you still have 
made a choice.”  RUSH, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Mercury 1980). 
36 See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 411, 421-28 (1996). 
37 Id. at 423. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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Suppose that Nicolas Cage, Diane Kruger, and Jon Voight squeeze some 
lemon juice on the Constitution, add some heat, and see a new Article VIII 
emerge40 that reads,  
In the event that there is any uncertainty about what this Constitution 
means in any specific application, resolve the uncertainty against the 
existence of federal power and in favor of the existence of state power.  In 
other words, presume that state laws and acts are constitutional unless 
something in this Constitution convinces you otherwise and presume that 
federal laws and acts are unconstitutional unless something in this 
Constitution convinces you otherwise.  
This provision would not, by itself, turn epistemological uncertainty into 
adjudicative determinacy.  To do so, the provision would also have to specify 
the standard of proof that has to be satisfied in order for the Constitution to 
convince you otherwise of something.41  But it would be a good start.  It would 
tell you, in essence, to do the best job that you can to ascertain constitutional 
meaning, would acknowledge that sometimes your best will not be enough to 
yield an epistemologically determinate answer, and would then tell you how to 
respond to that epistemological indeterminacy.  It would not tell you to engage 
in construction using “all of the various modalities of interpretation.”  It would 
tell you to declare the side with the burden of proof the loser and move on.42 
The Constitution, of course, does not contain any such Article VIII.  Or does 
it?  The federal government is entirely created – “ordain[ed] and 
establish[ed]”43 – by the Constitution.  This basic fact gives rise to the 
principle of enumerated powers and simultaneously gives rise, at least as a 
first-cut measure, to more or less the allocation of the burden of proof 
described in the hypothetical Article VIII for federal acts.  He who asserts must 
prove, and anyone claiming the authority of a federal act must assert the 
validity of that act, which requires showing that something in the federal 
Constitution authorizes the appropriate federal institution to perform the act in 
question.44  Of course, once that authorization is shown, there may be some 
other provision in the Constitution that arguably “trumps” or qualifies the basic 
authorization, such as the various “thou shalt not” provisions in Article I, 
Section 9 or the Bill of Rights.45  In that case, once the proponent of federal 
power has satisfied its initial burden of proof, the role of assertion switches to 
 
40 Cf. NATIONAL TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004). 
41 Lawson, supra note 36, at 411. 
42 Id. at 424. 
43 U.S. Const. pmbl. 
44 See Lawson, supra note 36, at 425-26 (“[T]here is always at least an implicit assertion 
in any exercise of federal power that there is something in the Constitution that affirmatively 
authorizes the federal government to act.”). 
45 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”). 
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whoever is claiming the protection of a trump, and that party accordingly bears 
the burden of proof, and therefore the burden of epistemological uncertainty, 
with respect to those claims. 
This framework also establishes the appropriate burden of proof for 
constitutional challenges to state laws and acts.  States do not need federal 
constitutional authorization to act.46  Anyone claiming that a state law or act 
violates the federal constitution is necessarily the asserter and therefore bears 
the burden of proof.  If it is uncertain whether the Constitution forbids a state 
from acting, the state (or whoever claims under the relevant state act) wins.  
The correct answer, in other words, is almost exactly the opposite of current 
practice, in which federal laws enjoy (at least in theory) a presumption of 
constitutionality while state laws come with a good measure of suspicion. 
One could, of course, call this allocation of burdens of proof a kind of 
constitutional construction: a principle not derived from any specific textual 
command (at least until National Treasure III reveals one) that nonetheless 
picks up the adjudicative slack in the face of interpretative indeterminacy.  
Fine.  Application of the Aristotelian laws of logic is also an extra-
constitutional “construction” of sorts, as is the notion that one should read the 
Constitution as though it was written in English.  These are very different 
kinds of “constructions” from those that Professor Balkin (or Professor 
Whittington or Professor Barnett) has in mind.  The proposition that he who 
asserts must prove is a basic principle of rational thinking, not a normative 
theory of governance.  My only point here is that a method of dealing with (not 
resolving, but dealing with) interpretative uncertainty emerges from ordinary 
interpretation-as-ascertainment.  One can ascertain what to do when one cannot 
ascertain. 
Well, almost.  One important dimension of the adjudicative enterprise does 
not appear to have an interpretative solution: the selection of a standard of 
proof for claims about constitutional meaning.47  Does someone trying to 
show, for example, that a particular federal institution is authorized to take a 
certain action have to make that showing by a preponderance of the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, beyond a conceivable doubt, or by some other 
standard?  The selection of a standard of proof can be outcome-determinative 
in adjudication, and I do not see anything in the Constitution that even 
implicitly selects the standard of proof.  Accordingly, one cannot shut down 
constitutional construction altogether; it is hard to see how one could select a 
standard of proof through anything other than moral theory.  But one can rope 
it off into a very small area. 
Professor Balkin, however, wants to fill all of the spaces left by the 
Constitution – however vast or small those spaces might be – with 
 
46 Lawson, supra note 35, at 427. 
47 For a general discussion of the crucial role of standards of proof for establishing the 
truth of legal propositions, see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 870 
(1992). 
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constructions of various sorts.  But it is quite possible to have a functioning 
constitutional system that simply leaves those spaces empty as an interpretative 
matter and fills them as an adjudicative matter without fixing or ascertaining 
any particular meanings in those spaces.  Interpretative uncertainty is not the 
same thing as adjudicative indeterminacy.  And without adjudicative 
indeterminacy, there is no need for construction. 
I am confident that Curly would have agreed. 
 
